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Abstract
It is well known that if mild sector–speciﬁc externalities are considered, then the steady
state of the standard two-sector real business cycle model can become locally indetermi-
nate and endogenous business cycles can arise. We show that this result is not robust to the
introduction of standard intertemporal capital adjustment costs, which may accrue when
total capital is adjusted or when each sector’s capital is adjusted. We ﬁnd for both forms of
adjustment costs that the steady state is determinate for all empirically plausible parameter
values. We also ﬁnd that determinacy occurs for a much larger range of parameter values
when adjusting each sector’s capital is costly.
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For a long time, economists have debated whether business cycle ﬂuctuations may, at least
partly, be driven by self-fulﬁlling changes in individual beliefs. One mayor problem with this
idea was that self–fulﬁlling changes in beliefs can occur only if the steady state is locally in-
determinate (i.e. locally non–unique), whereas in the standard real business model developed
by Kydland and Prescott (1982) it is determinate (i.e. locally unique). However, Benhabib and
Farmer(1996)arguedthatdeterminacyisnotagenericpropertyofthemodel. Inparticular, they
introduced mild sector–speciﬁc externalities into the standard two–sector version and showed
that this small modiﬁcation can lead to local indeterminacy.1 Since the required externalities
are mild and can be defended empirically, local indeterminacy, and the implied possibility of
self-fulﬁlling business cycles, looked much more plausible than previously. This has stimulated
numerous recent studies on self-fulﬁlling business cycles, such as Perli (1998), Weder (1998),
Schmitt-Grohe (2000), and Harrison and Weder (2001) to name only a few.
The present paper shows that the result of Benhabib and Farmer (1996) is not generic either.
In particular, we show that the local stability properties of the steady state of the two–sector
real business cycle model depend critically on whether or not adjusting capital is costly. While
Benhabib and Farmer assumed that it is not, we assume that it is. Our assumption can be
justiﬁed by at least three arguments. First, there is substantial empirical evidence in favor of
capital adjustment costs at the ﬁrm level; see Hammermesh and Pfann (1996) for a review
of the evidence. Second, without capital adjustment costs Tobin’s q (i.e. the ratio between
the price of installed capital and the price of new capital) is constant over the business cycle,
which is counterfactual. Third, without capital adjustment costs the allocations of the two-
sector model considered here have several counterfactual properties (such excess investment
volatility and countercyclical consumption) that disappear when capital adjustment costs are
modeled [Huﬀman and Wynne (1999) and Boldrin et al. (2001)].
We consider capital adjustment costs of the standard intertemporal form introduced by Lu-
cas and Prescott (1971) and distinguish between two possibilities: The costs can accrue either
when the total capital stock is changed (irrespective of by how much each sector’s capital stock
1Boldrin and Rustichini (1994) found a related result for a growth version of the model.
1changes) or when a sector’s capital stock is changed (irrespective of by how much the total
capital stock changes). Our main result is that both speciﬁcations eliminate the scope for local
indeterminacy, and thus the scope for self-fulﬁlling business cycles, for all empirically plausi-
ble parameter choices. We also ﬁnd that adjustment costs on sectoral capital lead to a larger
(smaller) parameter range for which determinacy (local indeterminacy) occurs than adjustment
costs on total capital.
The intuition for the main result of this paper is similar to that underlying the work by Kim
(1998), Wen (1998b), and Guo and Lansing (2001) on the eﬀects of capital adjustment costs on
the local stability properties of the one-sector neoclassical growth model. These authors found
that capital adjustment costs have an “oﬀsetting eﬀect”: Given a strength of increasing returns
that implies local indeterminacy, there is a minimum size of intertemporal capital adjustment
costs that makes local indeterminacy impossible. While this oﬀsetting eﬀect is at work here
too, the value added of our paper is to show that it matters for empirically relevant parameter
values in the two–sector version of the model. This is not an issue in the one–sector version
because local indeterminacy does not occur for empirically plausible parameter values anyway;
see for example Benhabib and Farmer (1994).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the economic environment.




holds, of identical ﬁrms that produce a perishable consumption good, and of identical ﬁrms that
produce new capital goods. The representative household is endowed with the initial capital
stocks, with the property rights of the representative ﬁrms, and with one unit of time at each
instant. We assume that installing new capital is costly and that installed capital is sector spe-
ciﬁc. At each point in time there are then ﬁve commodities: a consumption good, a new capital
good suitable for the production of consumption goods, a new capital good suitable for the
2production of new capital goods, labor for the consumption-producing sector, and labor for the
capital-producing sector. Trade takes place in sequential markets.





−ρt(logct − lct − lxt)dt, (1)
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate, log is the natural logarithm, ct denotes the consumption good
at time t (which is the numeraire), and lct and lxt are labor in the consumption- and in the capital-
producing sector. The instantaneous utility is separable in consumption and leisure, logarithmic
in consumption, and linear in leisure. This functional form is standard in the literature on self-
fulﬁlling business cycles, and it would be consistent with the existence of a balanced growth
path if exogenous technological progress were considered. The linear utility in leisure implies
an inﬁnite labor supply elasticity, which can be justiﬁed by the lottery argument of Hansen
(1985). Since it is easier to get local indeterminacy the higher is the labor supply elasticity,
the determinacy results to be derived for an inﬁnite labor supply elasticity would apply for any
ﬁnite labor supply elasticity too.
The representative household’s problem depends on the form that capital adjustment costs
take. The ﬁrst form arises when it is costly to change the total capital stock of the model
economy, irrespective of by how much each sector’s capital stock changes. In this ﬁrst case the









ct + ptxt = πct + πxt + wctlct + wxtlxt + rctkct + rxtkxt, (2b)
˙ kct = xct − δckct, (2c)
˙ kxt = xxt − δxkxt, (2d)
kc0 = ¯ kc0 given, kx0 = ¯ kx0 given, (2e)
0 ≤ ct,lct,lxt, xt, xct, xxt,kct,kxt, lct + lxt ≤ 1. (2f)
The function ψ : R+ −→ R+ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, monotonically increasing,
and convex. The notation is as follows: xt is the composite new capital good produced by the
capital–producing sector and pt is its relative price in terms of the consumption good, πct and
πxt are the two proﬁts (which will be zero in equilibrium), wct and wxt are the wages in the two
sectors, kct and kxt are the capital stocks in the two sectors, rct and rxt are the corresponding
real interest rates, δc and δx are the corresponding depreciation rates, and xct and xxt are the
investments in the two sectors.
The second form of capital adjustment costs arises when it matters by how much the capital
stocks of each sector change, irrespective of by how much the total capital stock changes. In
this second case the household’s problem, called (HP2), is to choose ct, lct, lxt, xt, xct, xxt, kct,












and (2b)–(2f). Again, the functions ψc,ψx : R+ −→ R+ are twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
monotonically increasing, and convex.
The way in which capital adjustment costs are modeled here is in the spirit of Lucas and
Prescott (1971). The strict convexity of ψ, ψc, and ψx captures the notion that it becomes the
more costly to change the capital stock the more quickly this is done. The non–negativity
constraints on the two capital goods, xct, xxt ≥ 0, imply that installed capital is sector speciﬁc,
which is consistent with the evidence reported by Ramey and Shapiro (2001). Nevertheless the
4capital stock of a sector can be reduced by not replacing depreciated capital, so in equilibrium
the non-negativity constraints will not be binding close the steady state and we can ignore them
from now on. It should be mentioned that the model version without capital adjustment costs is


















, j ∈ {c, x}.
Note that the model version without capital adjustment costs still has sector-speciﬁc capital.
This does not, however, matter for the local stability analysis because sector-speciﬁc capital
alone does not have an eﬀect [Christiano (1995) and Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2002)].
Denoting by λt the multiplier attached to (2b) and by µct and µxt the current value multipliers
attached to the accumulation equations (2c) and (2d), the solution to (HP1) is characterized by
(2a)–(2f) and
















λtrct − µctδc = λtrxt − µxtδx, (3d)


















t→∞µxtkxt = 0. (3f)
The solution to (HP2) is characterized by (2b)–(2g) and

































































t→∞µxtkxt = 0. (4f)








ct , ct,lct,kct ≥ 0, (5)












For future reference, note that the production function and (6b) imply that
lct = 1 − a, (7a)




The representative ﬁrm of the capital-producing sector solves:
max
xtlxt,kxt




xt , xt,kxt,lxt ≥ 0, (8)
where b ∈ (0,1) denotes the constant capital share parameter and Bt ≥ 0 denotes total factor
productivity in the sector, which is given from the representative ﬁrm’s perspective. The ﬁrst–











Bt is speciﬁed so that there are positive externalities at the level of the capital–producing sector.
This is consistent with the empirical evidence in favor of positive externalities in the production
of manufacturing durables [Basu and Fernald (1997)]. The externalities are modeled as is stan-
dard in the related literature by assuming that total factor productivity in the capital-producing




















β1 ≡ (1 + θ)b, β2 ≡ (1 + θ)(1 − b). (10c)
Some features of this speciﬁcation deserve further comment. First, the upper bound 1−b
b on θ
is imposed to exclude the possibility of endogenous growth and to guarantee the stationarity
of our model economy. For plausible parameter values it will not be binding. Second, (10a)
implies that the externalities on capital and labor are the same. The reason for this assumption
is that separate estimates for the strength of the resulting increasing returns do not exist.2 Third,
as is standard, the externality is not taken into account by the individual ﬁrms in the capital-
producing sector, so a competitive equilibrium exists. Moreover, equilibrium proﬁts are zero





kt = 1 − b. Of course, in a competitive equilibrium the Bt on which the ﬁrms base their
decisions must be equal to the Bt that results from these decisions:
2The results of Harrison and Weder (2001) suggest that imposing this constraint does not aﬀect the stability
properties of two-sector models in an important way.
7Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium are prices {wct, wxt,rct,rxt,
pt}∞
t=0, allocations {ct,lct,lxt, xt, xct, xxt,kct,kxt}∞
t=0, and total factor productivity in the capital-
producing sector {Bt}∞
t=0 such that: (i) {ct,lct,lxt, xt, xct, xxt,kct,kxt}∞
t=0 solve the problem of the
representative household; (ii) {ct,lct,kct}∞
t=0 solve the problem of the representative ﬁrm of the
consumption-producing sector, (5); (iii) {xt,lxt,kxt}∞
t=0 solve the problem of the representative
ﬁrm of the capital-producing sector, (8); (iv) Bt is determined consistently, that is, (10a) holds.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
Combining the ﬁrst–order conditions derived above, it can be shown that with (HP1) the equi-
librium dynamics is characterized by the terminal conditions (3f) together with the following









































˙ µct = µct




















˙ kct = xct − δckct, (11g)
˙ kxt = xxt − δxkxt. (11h)
Equation(11a)speciﬁeshowtheequilibriumsuppliesofthetwonewcapitalgoodsarerelatedto
the output of the capital–producing sector. It follows by substituting the ﬁrst equation of (10b)
into (2a). Equation (11b) restates equation (3c). It speciﬁes how the equilibrium demands of the
two new capital goods depend on the relative price of installed capital in terms of new capital,
µct
λtpt, whichisoftencalledTobin’sq. Notethatthepresenceofadjustmentcostspermitsvariation
8in Tobin’s q.3 Equation (11c) says that the marginal utility from leisure is to be equalized to the
marginal utility from the increase in the capital–producing sector’s output due to the last unit
of labor. It follows by substituting (9b), (10a), and (11b) into (3a). Equation (11d) says that the
marginal products of labor are to be equalized in equilibrium. It follows by substituting (6b)
and (9b) into (3a). Equation (11e) says that the marginal products of installed capital net of
depreciation are to be equalized in equilibrium. Note that with (HP1) this holds in equilibrium
because the costs come from adjusting the total capital stock irrespectively of how two sectors’
capital stocks are adjusted. (11e) follows by substituting (6a), (7), the second equation of (8),
(9a), and (10a) into (3d). Equation (11f) describes the equilibrium law of motion of the shadow
price of installed capital. It follows by substituting (3c), (6a) and (7) into (3e). Note that since
with (HP1) the shadow prices of the two installed capital goods are equal, only one law of
motion is required. The equations in (11g) and (12h) are the laws of motion from (2c) and (2d)
once more.
Combining the ﬁrst–order conditions derived above, it can be shown that with (HP2) the
equilibrium dynamics is characterized by the terminal conditions (4f) together with the follow-

















































˙ µct = µct





















˙ µxt = µxt























3When we speak of Tobin’s q here, we mean marginal q. In any case, there is no diﬀerence between marginal q
and average q in our model because the capital adjustment costs used here are linear homogeneous in its arguments
[Hayashi (1982)].
9˙ kct = xct − δckct, (12h)
˙ kxt = xxt − δxkxt. (12i)
Equation (12a) speciﬁes how the equilibrium productions of the two new capital goods are
related to the output of the capital–producing sector. It follows by substituting the ﬁrst equation
of (10b) into (2g). The equations in (12b) and (12c) restate equations (4c) and (4c). They
specify how the equilibrium demands of the two new capital goods depend on the relative




λtpt. Equations (12d) and (12e) are
equations (11c) and (11d) once more. Equations (12f) and (12g) describe the equilibrium laws
of motion of the shadow prices of installed capital. Note that with (HP2) the marginal products
of installed capital net of depreciation need no longer be equal because the costs of adjusting
the two sectors’ capital stocks can drive a wedge between them. (12f) and (12g) follow by
substituting (4c) and (4c) into (4d) and (4e), respectively, and plugging (6a) and (7) into the
results. The equations in (12h) and (12i) are the laws of motion from (2c) and (2d) once more.
In order to guarantee the existence of a steady state, we need to put more structure on ψ,
ψc, and ψx. We adopt the standard assumption that the capital adjustment costs do not aﬀect the
steady state of the model economy. Denoting steady state variables by dropping the time index,
















































Thus, we are left with the three second derivatives as free parameters, which will play a key
role for the local stability properties of the steady state.
Proposition 1 (Steady state) Given (15), there is a unique steady state. The steady state is the
same for (HP1) and (HP2).






































xc = δckc, xx = δxkx. (16g)



























That these equations have a unique solution can be seen as follows. First, solve (17c) for kc and
substitute the result into (17b). This gives lx as a function of kx. Substitute this into (17a) to get
kc as a linear function of kx. Substituting this into (17c) gives lx. Obtaining kx and kc is then
straightforward. 
4 Local Stability Properties
We start the discussion of the local stability properties with the observation that the reduced-
form equilibrium dynamics with (HP1) and with (HP2) have diﬀerent dimensions. With (HP1)
the dynamics is two dimensional and it is composed of the aggregate capital stock as the state
and of one control, which we choose to be µct. This is like in the model version without capital
11adjustment costs. The reason is that the capital adjustment costs in (HP1) accrue from changes
in the total capital stock, kct+kxt, so µct = µxt; see (3b). As a result, it remains costless to change
the allocation of a given total capital stock across the two sectors. With (HP2) the dynamics is
four dimensional and it is composed of the two sectors’ capital stocks kct and kxt as the states
and of two controls, which we choose to be µct and µxt. This is unlike the model version without
capital adjustment costs. The reason is that the capital adjustment costs in (HP2) accrue from
changes of each of the two sectors’ capital stocks separately, so µct , µxt; see (4b). As a result,
it becomes costly to change the allocation of a given total capital stock across the two sectors
and each sector’s capital stock becomes a state and the corresponding shadow price a control.
The steady state is saddle-path stable if and only if the matrix of the linearization at the
steady has as many stable roots (i.e. roots with negative real part) as states and as many unstable
roots (i.e. roots with positive real part) as controls. If the steady state is saddle-path stable, then
the equilibrium nearby is determinate, that is, given the initial capital stocks close to the steady
state values there are unique initial shadow prices such that the economy converges to the steady
state. The steady state is stable if and only if it has more stable roots than states. If the steady
state is stable, then the equilibrium nearby is locally indeterminate, that is, given the initial
capital stocks close to the steady state pair there exists a continuum of shadow prices such that
the economy converges to the steady state. The steady state is unstable if and only if has more
unstable roots than controls.
Since the reduced–form equilibrium dynamics with (HP1) is two dimensional, one could
in this ﬁrst case compute the two eigenvalues and characterize the local stability properties
analytically if one were prepared to assume that the two depreciation rates are the same. The
calibration we use does not indicate that this is the case. Since the dynamics with (HP2) is
four dimensional, it becomes impossible in this second case to compute the four eigenvalues
analytically and to obtain analytical results. We will choose a functional form for ψ, ψc, and ψx
and empirically plausible parameters values and we will then compute the eigenvalues for both








































where κ1, κ2, κc1, κc2, κx1, κx2, and ϕ are constants. The six constants κ1–κx2 are chosen so as
to ensure that the six restrictions listed in (15) are satisﬁed (i.e. there is no eﬀect of the capital
adjustment costsin steadystate). Theparameter ϕ aﬀects thecurvature ofthe capitaladjustment
costs. In fact, the expressions in (11b)–(12c) show that ϕ is the inverse of the elasticity of the
relevant investment–to–installed–capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s q.
The inverse of the elasticity of the investment–to–installed–capital ratio with respect to To-
bin’s q and the degree of increasing returns in the capital-producing sector are the key parame-
ters that determine the local stability properties of the steady state. We will therefore not choose
a benchmark calibration for them but vary them widely. To get an idea about the intervals in
which plausible parameter choices can lie, we brieﬂy report the key empirical evidence. Eberly
(1997) estimates ϕ from a panel of OECD countries and reports point estimates in [0.51,1.54],
with the US having 0.82. If one computes the conﬁdence intervals of the diﬀerent estimates,
then the lowest possible realization for the whole sample is 0.34, which comes from the French
data, and the lowest possible realization for the US is 0.74. Jermann (1998) calibrates ϕ the
US economy and ﬁnds a much larger value: 4.35.4 We conclude that values for ϕ short of 0.34
are unreasonable. The evidence about θ is as follows. Hall’s (1988) initially estimated θ ≈ 0.5.
It turned out, however, that this estimate was upward biased. More recent empirical studies
instead ﬁnd estimates between constant returns and much milder increasing returns that at most
might reach 0.3; see e.g. Bartelsman et al. (1994), Burnside et al. (1995), or Basu and Fernald
(1997). It is generally agreed by now that values for θ in excess of 0.3 are unreasonable.
4The discrepancy can be understood as follows. Jermann calibrates his model such that asset pricing paradoxes
can be accounted for. High inverse elasticities are helpful to this end because they allow for persistent deviations
of q from its steady state value.
13Figure 1: Local stability with a = 0.41, b = 0.34, ρ = 0.01, δc = 0.018, δx = 0.020.
(a) costly adjustment of total capital

















(b) costly adjustment of sectoral capital

















The remaining parameters to be chosen are a, b, ρ, δc, and δx. Some recent related studies
set them as follows. Benhabib and Farmer (1996) choose a = b = 0.3, ρ = 0.0125, and
δc = δx = 0.026. Huﬀman and Wynne (1999) choose a = 0.41, b = 0.34, ρ = 0.01, δc = 0.018,
and δx = 0.020. Boldrin et al. (2001) choose a = b = 0.36, ρ = 0.00001, δc = δx = 0.021. We
will use the parameter choices of Huﬀman and Wynne (1999) but conduct extensive sensitivity
checks that incorporate the other possibilities too, except for the rather awkward choice of
ρ = 0.00001.
The local stability properties for our benchmark calibration are summarized by Figure 1.
In particular, Figure 1(a) shows the case of adjustment costs on total capital and Figure 1(b)
shows the case of adjustment costs on sectoral capital. The main result of this paper is that,
in both cases, determinacy of the steady state occurs for ϕ ≥ 0.34 and θ ≤ 0.3, which, as we
argued above, are necessary (but by no means suﬃcient) conditions for a reasonable choice of
the parameter values. This result turns out to be very robust to changes in the other parameter
values. For example, we ﬁxed ϕ and θ at the two values for which local indeterminacy results
most easily and varied instead the other parameters; ϕ = 0.34, θ = 0.3, ρ, δc, δx each varied over
[0.005,0.03] in steps of size 0.001, b varied over [0.25,045] in steps of size 0.01. We failed
to ﬁnd any parameter combination within these intervals for which the steady state is locally
14indeterminate. Instead it is determinate everywhere in these intervals.
Two interesting aspects of the above ﬁgures deserve further comment: The local indetermi-
nacyrangeissigniﬁcantlylargerwithcostlyadjustmentoftotalcapitalwhereasthedeterminacy
parameter range is signiﬁcantly larger with costly adjustment of sectoral capital. One implica-
tion of this fact is observed as the adjustment costs parameter ϕ converges to 0. For the ﬁrst
form of adjustment costs the local stability properties change from determinacy to local inde-
terminacy at θ = and from local indeterminacy to instability at θ = 0.197. These threshold
values are exactly the same as without capital adjustment costs, so the local stability properties
change continuously as ϕ goes to zero. In contrast, for the second form of adjustment costs
the local stability properties do not change continuously; instead as ϕ goes to zero the ﬁrst
threshold disappears and only the second one survives.5 This diﬀerence between the two forms
of adjustment costs is related to the change of dimension of the reduced–form dynamics from
four to two. We study it in detail in a follow–up paper, Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2002), for
intratemporal capital adjustment costs.6
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the question whether business cycle ﬂuctuations can be driven by
self-fulﬁlling changes in individual beliefs. This would be the case if the steady state is locally
indeterminate. We have explored this possibility in the standard two–sector version with mild
sector–speciﬁc externalities, which has been the focus of much of the recent research on self-
fulﬁlling business cycles. We have found that the introduction of standard intertemporal capital
adjustment costs excludes self-fulﬁlling business cycles for all empirically reasonable choices
of the parameter values. This ﬁnding turns out to be independent of whether these adjustment
costs arise from changes of the total capital stock or from changes of each sector’s capital stock.
The results of this paper imply that the occurrence of local indeterminacy in the two-sector
5Note that in the second case we could not formally take the limit in the numerical computations. The smallest
ϕ we considered was 1.000000001.
6The diﬀerence is as follows. Intratemporal capital adjustment costs accrue when the allocation of capital
across sectors is changed but not when the total capital stock is changed while that allocation remains the same.
Intertemporal capital adjustment costs accrue in both cases.
15real business cycle model with sector-speciﬁc externalities is not robust. This suggests that
other versions of the neoclassical growth model are required to demonstrate the plausibility
of local indeterminacy. One possibility is opened by the recent work of Wen (1998a), who
shows that local indeterminacy can occur in the one–sector version of the model for reasonable
parameter values when capital utilization is variable. Guo and Harrison (2001) conﬁrm that also
in the standard two-sector model variable capital utilization decreases the degree of increasing
returns that yield local indeterminacy. Exploring the robustness of this new channel to capital
adjustment costs is an interesting topic, which we leave for future research.
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